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By 1763, the small nation of Great Britain had conquered a vast empire 
which stretched from North America to India. From 1775 to 1902, the British 
would fight many wars to expand and protect their empire. During this span of 
time, new weapons were invented, from the rifled musket to the Maxim machine 
gun. These new weapons would undoubtedly cause a change in the British 
Army's tactics. It was for these reasons that I decided examine at the period 
from 1775 to 1902. Within this time frame great changes in weapons occur, 
which could have influenced tactics. Much fighting also takes place against a 
variety of opponents armed with a varying collection of weapons. This allows 
one to gain a general idea of how quickly the British Army employed new 
weapons and which tactics worked against which opponents. 
1 
The changes in technology and the amount and nature of the fighting that 
takes place from 1775 to 1902 allows for the close examination of the evolution 
of land warfare. It is for this reason that I chose to examine this time period. 
1902 is also a turning point in warfare for Britain; the Boer War represented the 
beginning of the end for the British Empire. By the 1960s the Empire no longer 
existed and the British began to take second place to the United States in terms 
of military power after the Second World War. 
The British fought more than sixty wars from 1837 to 1902, in Queen 
Victoria's name. Since not all of the wars featured real advances in strategy, 
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tactics, or technology, this paper seeks to study those that had great significance 
on one of these bases. 
The British could not have expanded or held onto their empire without 
fighting many different opponents. For the most part, these opponents 
possessed weapons that were inferior to the British weapons. When the British 
did fight enemies that had weapons equal to their own, they ran into difficulties 
defeating their enemies. Each war presented new challenges to the British. 
They had to adapt to theses challenges and use new and more deadly weapons 
in order to remain victorious. 
CHAPTER2 
KING GEORGE THE 111'$ WARS 
Tactics: Britain's way of war before the colonies rebelled 
To understand how the British Army fought during the reign of Queen 
Victoria, first one must examine the American Revolution and the Napoleonic 
wars. The reason is that battles that occurring after 1815 are very much like the 
battles that happened when the British fought the Americans and the French. 
Both of these wars were fought using ideas that had come about during the 
Seven Years War. 
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The British military establishment prepared to fight European enemies that 
resembled the British army in most respects. The tactics came from the Seven 
Years War against Austria, France, and Russia. A legacy of Fredrick the Great 
of Prussia, Britain's military had not seen the need to change its tactics during 
the twelve-year interval between the end of the Seven Years War and the 
beginning of the American Revolution. These tactics consisted of infantry 
arranged in linear formations. The infantry would march to a range of fifty to one 
hundred yards distance and then engage in a musketry exchange. When one 
side weakened to the point where it was losing cohesion, the other side would 
make a bayonet charge. These bayonet charges rarely resulted in a general 
melee since the weakened infantry unit would generally break and run before any 
contact could be made. 
As established by Fredrick the Great, commanders generally posted the 
cavalry arm of the army on the flanks. The British cavalry, often described as the 
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best trained and worst led arm of the British army, would often occupy the flanks 
but remained in reserve to exploit any breakthrough the infantry could achieve. 
Cavalry had other uses on the battlefield though; the British light cavalry was also 
there in case a disaster occurred. In the event that the army lost the battle, the 
light cavalry would make a suicidal charge to check the enemy cavalry forces. 
This would give the British infantry and artillery time to escape. 
Armies used artillery very differently during the eighteenth century than its 
use today. Since a cannon was unable to fire much farther than the gun crew 
could see, artillery did not dominate a battlefield as it can today. Nor were 
artillery shells as effective, during the late eighteenth century, since round shot, 
the main form of ordinance for cannons, did not explode. Instead, round shot 
would bounce a few times then roll to a stop. Howitzers and mortars were able 
to fire ordnance that would explode, however if the fuse was not cut perfectly, the 
'shells' would either explode to soon or hit the ground which would allow 
someone to pull out the fuse. Artillery pieces were also much heavier than those 
of even the Napoleonic period. This meant that artillery pieces could not keep up 
with an advance and could be obscured by their own forces. Thus artillery 
pieces were often spread out across the entire line supported by infantry and 
cavalry. There was no massing of guns in grand batteries or corps artillery 
formations before Napoleon. Cannons did have devastating short-range 
ordnance round, known as canister shot. Canister was a tin case that was filled 
with musket balls, and which when fired would spread out and have an effect 
similar to a shotgun. Unfortunately, canister's had to be used at short range to 
be effective and so it was usually used to break up enemy assaults. 
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Military discipline has to be discussed since there are those who have the 
popular belief that the British soldier was nothing but a simple brute. Discipline in 
the British army was quite severe. It was not uncommon to flog a soldier for a 
minor infraction while most major infractions, cowardice, and desertion for 
example carried the death sentence. Modern writers criticize the British army for 
this fact saying it was a factor of the loss of the American Revolution. In truth, 
discipline was harsh because it had to be. When being shot at, the natural 
reaction for most people is to either run or to take cover. To maintain discipline 
the British army like other armies had to punish the men so that they would act 
against a natural instinct. 
The American Revolution: 
In 1775, the British Army found itself embroiled in a war against the 
American Colonies. The British military had not seen many significant changes 
since the Seven Years War, and the main firearm the British Army used was of 
the type used during the Seven Years war. All infantry battalions in the British 
Army used the Brown Bess musket during the Revolutionary War. 1 The Brown 
Bess was highly inaccurate at more than one hundred yards so it was only 
suitable for use against tightly packed formations of men at close range. The 
American colonists, however, did not have a standing army accustomed to 
fighting an enemy on an open battlefield with regular infantry battalions. Instead, 
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the colonists were experienced in fighting the Native Americans who fought 
under cover in heavily forested areas. To shoot an individual reliably, a rifle was 
indeed the weapon to use in this period. 
Though the British used rifles for hunting purposes in Great Britain, these 
weapons were deemed unsuitable for the line battalions. The reasoning for not 
adopting the rifles was that rifles were expensive, difficult to manufacture, and it 
hard to load. Rifles also gave too much independence and control to individual 
soldiers. Therefore, the British Army found it to be unnecessary to train 
marksmen prior to the American War of Independence. 
The most notable change to occur was the formation of the light company 
within the regiments of the army. The light company was an elite body of men 
who would guard the vulnerable left flank of the regiment during battle. 
Advocates included prominent soldiers as, General William Howe. Howe 
believed in using light companies in assaulting enemy strong points. The logic of 
the time stated that these lightly encumbered men would be able to bypass 
fortifications and scale obstacles easier than the line infantrymen or a grenadier2. 
The light companies were not yet trained to fight as skirmishers in front of 
the main bodies of troops. Instead, these elite soldiers still fought within the 
regiment main body. General Howe used his light troops at the Battle of Breeds 
1 Warren Moore, Weapons of the American Revolution and Accoutrements p 61 
2 Grenadiers were the tallest, and bravest men within the regiment and were placed on the right flank of all 
British regiments. Formed in the 1700s, the name grenadier comes from the men carrying hand grenades 
into battle and hurling them at the enemy. These grenades weighed around two pounds thus the tallest men 
were required. The belief was that one's height was related to how strong one was, and they were 
considered the bravest in the regiment, for similar reasons. 
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Hill, more commonly known as the Battle of Bunker Hill. Owing largely to an 
uncooperative navy, General Howe had to order several frontal assaults on the 
colonial fortifications that had sprung up overnight. Massed grenadier companies 
and the massed light companies of several British regiments carried out these 
attacks. Convinced that the American militia would turn and run at the sight of 
the best troops he could muster, General Howe was dismayed when his troops 
were bloodily repulsed. The men occupying American fortifications on Breeds 
Hill fired as fast as they could load their muskets rather than organized steady 
volleys like European troops.3 Neither the grenadier's, who fought with full kits, 
nor the light infantrymen were able to breech American defenses. 
General Howe reformed his men and attacked the American positions 
again. For a second time the best troops under General Howe's command had 
attacked and again they were thrown back. In all, the British would need four 
assaults to dislodge the American militia from the fortifications. The fourth 
assault likely succeeded because the American troops ran out of powder, and 
the British grenadiers were allowed to finally drop their packs. While the act of 
taking off a pack seems like a small thing, carrying fifty-five pounds of equipment 
did fatigue the British soldiers in the hot humid weather of June 1775, faster than 
the American soldiers were becoming fatigued. These battles forever changed 
General Howe's fight against General George Washington. Howe became the 
3 Robert Leckie. George Washington's Warp 160 
cautious commander that historians criticize because of the losses his men took 
at the Battle of Breeds Hill. 
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General Howe changed how he fought battles. Rather than risking his 
army in frontal attacks, Howe found ways to attack the American army's flanks. 
Howe earned an impressive number of victories against Washington; however, 
once Howe had defeated Washington's army, he did not pursue it. Howe has 
often been accused of being indecisive when he had opportunities to destroy 
Washington's army. This view is overly critical of Howe since he was only 
keeping his army intact. General Howe had a very small army in a hostile area 
where he could not be sure of the populace's loyalties. Rather than pursuing and 
risking his army in an ambush, Howe erred on the side of caution, which allowed 
Howe to maintain a sizable force in the field for years. Moreover, Howe, and his 
brother Admiral Richard Howe, had appointments to help negotiate a peace once 
they won the fighting, and this may have affected their tactics, to keep an 
American leadership intact so that it could negotiate surrender and a return to the 
British Empire. 
General John Burgoyne also commanded an expedition against 
Americans, but he invaded the colonies from Canada with the idea of splitting the 
colonies in two. From the beginning Burgoyne made mistakes which slowed 
down his advance. Burgoyne wished to take heavy cannons with him, and since 
cannons must be taken along a road of some sort, the British soldiers had to cut 
one out of the wilderness as they marched because taking the artillery overland 
was faster than by sea. The British soldiers accomplished this remarkable feat, 
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and Burgoyne was able to bring up his guns. To make matters worse, as the 
British moved south along the lakes separating present day New York and 
Vermont, American militia felled trees across the roads. This slowed the armies' 
advance even more; had Burgoyne left his heavy guns in Canada, the army 
could have advanced much more quickly. 
The entire campaign led to the Battle of Saratoga. One of the worst 
defeats that the British army ever suffered at the hands of an American army, 
Burgoyne would be forced to surrender his army. Burgoyne fought the battle very 
well but had to surrender not because General Horatio Gage outfought him, but 
because he had no hope of support and was desperately outnumbered.4 
The American forces commanded by Gage occupied the hills of the area, 
which in warfare is an immense advantage. Burgoyne was not deterred though, 
knowing if he could defeat this army, Howe would arrive soon with support. 
Burgoyne attempted two separate attacks against the American left flank at 
Saratoga. This was a very sensible move since the American commander left 
his left flank somewhat exposed to higher hills farther to the left. Burgoyne was 
only stopped by General Benedict Arnold's troops' actions; Arnold led his men in 
an attack against the flanking movements without Gage's consent. Burgoyne 
just had too few men to make the attacks work, while Gage's command was 
continually strengthened by the arrival of reinforcements. 
4 Robert Leckie, George Washington's Warp 414-416 
How General Lord Charles Cornwallis fought in the south was much 
different from way the British fought in the north. Instead of facing Washington 
who fought as European's did, Cornwallis eventually faced General Nathaniel 
Greene and General Daniel Morgan who fought with primarily a militia army. 
Cornwallis campaign in the south was filled with obstacles that were unique to 
the southern United States. First, Cornwallis opponents, Greene and Morgan, 
did not fight him in the European style of battle. Instead Greene and Morgan 
fighting on ground of their choosing, hit Cornwallis supply lines and his 
communications. 
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Cornwallis tactics were not very inventive; they were, in fact, the same he 
had seen and used during the Seven Years War. Cornwallis went straight at his 
opponent, but considering the quality of most of the American troops in the 
South, Cornwallis did not have to use anything but frontal assaults. That is, soon 
after the taking of Savannah late in 1779, Cornwallis surrounded Charleston and, 
with the help of the British Navy, compelled the surrender of General Benjamin 
Lincoln and some 5,000 American troops. Thereafter, at the Battle of Camden, 
the British troops routed the Americans with no problem. Then the Continental 
Congress appointed a new Southern Commander and Cornwallis had to contend 
with new problems. 
Cornwallis first problem was identifying the enemy when one day they 
were farmers and the next soldiers. Cornwallis was not always able to identify 
those citizens who were loyal to the king, those who were not, and those who did 
not care. So Cornwallis loyalists were given a somewhat free reign in attacking 
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those sympathetic to the rebel's cause. This was a mistake on Cornwallis part. 
The loyalists and the rebels in the south fought with a great savagery which was 
only equaled by the American Civil War. Cornwallis strategy to pacify the 
countryside with the Loyalist troops under his command only added to the 
growing resentment of the British. 
Moreover, Morgan and Greene learned how best to use ill-trained militia 
and irregular forces. After the Battle of King's Mountain, Morgan arranged his 
men in successive lines, the least trained in the front, and progressively asked 
more of them. This buffer strategy worked to perfection at the Battle of Cowpens 
in January 1781. Greene expanded this battle strategy to a campaign and 
gradually retreated across the Dan River into Virginia drawing Cornwallis even 
farther from his source of supplies and then fought a battle on a field of his 
choosing at Guilford Court House. As a consequence, Cornwallis retreated to 
Hillsboro, North Carolina and later Wilmington and then advanced into Virginia 
largely forsaking the outposts across South Carolina he worked so hard to 
establish. 
Cornwallis had to deal with Morgan and Greene attacking his supply lines 
as well. So Cornwallis decided to build forts along his supply lines. These forts 
were to be built within a day's march of each other so that the supply trains could 
be protected at night, and in the event of an attack, reinforcements could arrive 
very quickly from one of two forts. Cornwallis forts ultimately were a hindrance to 
him and not a benefit. Since Cornwallis was forced to leave troops behind to 
guard the forts, his army quickly became ineffective, forcing him to abandon this 
idea. Greene learned to leverage his limited Continental soldiers and cavalry 
with local irregulars to overwhelm these now isolated outposts as Cornwallis 
moved to his fate at Yorktown in September 1781. 
The Napoleonic Wars: 
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When the French overthrew their king and set up a republic, England and 
France began to fight a war that lasted for more than twenty years. During this 
time England adapted some new tactics, weapons, and ideas for fighting the 
French. England watched as France's conscript armies defeated each of the 
Continental powers. When Napoleon Bonaparte came into power, England 
watched as Napoleon conquered most of Europe. For the most part, England 
fought Napoleon at sea while the army waited. 
During this long wait, the army began a great experiment with the use of 
rifles and skirmishers. Advocated by General Sir John Moore and with the Duke 
of York as a patron, the experiment began small as experiments do. One 
regiment that would become known as the 95th Rifle regiment would be armed 
with the Baker Rifle. This regiment would serve in the Peninsula Campaign 
against the French and become well known for its discipline and sharpshooters. 
An example of the skill the 95th possessed for shooting would be when Rifleman 
Thomas Plunkett killed General de Brigade Auguste-Marie-Francois Colbert at a 
distance of three hundred yards.5 The baker rifle had a thirty-inch barrel, and 
fired a varying caliber round of .615 to .70 calibers.6 The baker rifle could also 
5 Eric Niderost "Military History" August 2002, pg 16 
6 Philip J. Haythomthwaite Weapons and Equipment of the Napoleonic Wars pg 25 
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have a sword bayonet attached to it, which allowed the riflemen to defend 
themselves against cavalry and a determined infantry charge. Due to the small 
barrel the Baker rifle allowed a soldier to fire and reload from the prone position 
which meant that a rifleman could make himself as small a target as possible. 
This experimental rifle unit not only used a rifle but fought in a new way as 
well. The riflemen would deploy as skirmishers in front of the main line of 
infantry, as a screen against the French voltiguers.7 The riflemen fought in two 
men teams, one firing while the other reloaded. The riflemen were also taught to 
target officers and sergeants. This was a new idea for the British army, before 
the British had always fought as gentlemen; they did not accord officers any 
undue amount of fire. During the Revolutionary War though, they had learned 
the lesson that the loss of officers and sergeants could disrupt a regiment's 
operations as the chain of command was destroyed. 
The tactics of the rifles were not the only adaptation made during the 
wars. When Sir Arthur Wellesley, later the first Duke of Wellington, took 
command of the Peninsular Campaign, he brought new ideas. Sir Arthur's army 
was small compared to the French armies in Spain. Since he was outnumbered 
in virtually every battle he fought, Sir Arthur came up with a revolutionary 
defensive tactic. Wellington fought battles on ground of his own choosing and 
positioned his men on the reverse sides of ridges and hills while ordering them to 
lie down. This innovative idea protected Wellington's troops from the devastating 
pre-assault bombardment of French artillery; it also protected the British soldiers 
14 
from the French skirmishers. Only at the battles of Salamanca and Vittoria did 
Wellington not use this tactic, since Wellington was attacking the French and not 
defending against them. 
This reverse slope tactic had several additional benefits; it kept 
Wellington's artillery from being blocked by the British infantry and the French 
from knowing the exact position of the British forces. Wellington's infantry were 
so well hidden from view that when the French did attack, they often believed 
they were attacking Wellington's flank when they were attacking his center. This 
allowed Wellington to bring enfilading fire upon the French columns. 
The infantry had changed very little from the American Revolutionary war. 
Though the light companies now screened the regiment's advance, holding off 
French skirmishers, the battalion still fought in lines of two ranks deep. Fighting 
in a two rank line was an advantage against the French attack column, because 
the line was longer than the column was wide. Thus the British infantry was able 
to fire more muskets than the French could and part of the British line, usually the 
right and left flanks could turn slightly and fire at an enfilading8 angle. French 
columns soon became a disorganized mass after one or two volleys. Then the 
British infantry advanced with fixed bayonets and the French columns retreated 
before a general melee could ensue. 
Infantry tactics against cavalry had changed after the American Revolution 
as well. Before this, generally speaking, infantry was able to stop any charge by 
7 The Voltiguers were the French light infantry, but they were armed with muskets and not rifles. 
8 Enflading fire is when one is firing into the side of an enemy formation. The shot fired have more of a 
target, while the formation being fired into cannot respond with any shots of its own. 
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cavalry with a well placed volley. During the Napoleonic wars this was not the 
case. The only defense for infantry against cavalry was the open square 
formation. Presented with a virtual immovable wall of bayonets, which horses 
would not charge, cavalry charges often failed when infantry formed square. On 
the rare instances when a square was "broken" by a cavalry charge, a horse was 
killed in a volley and slide into the wall of men. This created an opening that 
allowed other cavalry men to ride through and exploit; but for the most part, the 
rule was cavalry did not charge infantry in square. 
Wellington never had as many artillery pieces at his disposal that the 
French marshals. So Wellington did not concentrate his guns into a 'grand 
battery' rather he deployed his cannons along his entire front. One would think 
that this would have put Wellington at a disadvantage because he did not have 
any overwhelming firepower at one point and since the largest British artillery 
piece was a nine-pound cannon, compared to a French twelve-pound gun. 
Instead, spreading out his guns allowed Wellington's artillery to cover any point 
of advance the French columns would conceivably take. British artillery also had 
a secret weapon in the form of spherical case shot. 
Henry Shrapnel invented case shot which came into use in 1804. Case 
shot had a thinner casing than normal shell so that it could burst. Filled with 
musket balls, and if fuse was cut correctly, the shell could shower its target with 
musket-balls. The British had also developed rockets into a new artillery arm. 
Developed by Sir William Congreve and fully supported by the Prince of Wales, 
the Congreve rockets saw use on the Peninsula, in Germany, and at the Battle of 
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Waterloo. The rocket consisted of a warhead attached to a pole and was fired 
from the ground or a tripod mount. Though terrifying to horses and men because 
the rockets made a terribly frightening screaming sound as they descended, 
rockets were very inaccurate. In fact the rockets, on occasion, came back at 
those who launched them. So rockets were not used very often and did not 
enjoy much success against the enemy. Though outgunned and smaller than 
the French guns, the British artillery performed quite well throughout the 
Napoleonic Wars and helped the Duke of Wellington win all his battles. 
Compared to the infantry and artillery performances, Wellington's cavalry 
did not perform very well on the battlefield. Cavalry tactics had changed greatly 
since the American Revolutionary War. New tactics had emerged after the 
French Revolution. Instead of charging in long lines, the cavalry had adopted 
charging with squadron's supporting each other. Due to this change, a cavalry 
charge became much more devastating; before this an infantry line could halt a 
cavalry charge with a volley at close range. So the standard infantry tactic was 
to form square which presented a wall of bayonets that the horses would not 
charge. Lancers9 were believed to be able to break squares since they could in 
theory stab at the square until it was weak enough to destroy it. However, 
French lancers never broke a British square during the Peninsula campaign. 
British cavalry were not present in sufficient number to be used in an 
offensive role. Instead the cavalry was employed to stop French cavalry 
9 Lancers were a cavalry troop armed with long spears called lances. The British army did not outfit any 
regiments with lances till after the Peninsula war. 
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advances and flanking maneuvers except for a few rare instances. One of the 
rare occurrences was at the Battle of Salamanca where the British cavalry 
crushed French infantry columns, then reformed and charged again. This was a 
example of what could happen to infantry not in square. Though many French 
soldiers survived, they did so because they ran for British lines and found refuge 
within British formations. At Salamanca the British cavalry was effective through 
the entire course of the battle. Normally the British cavalry charged once and 
then was completely useless for the rest of the battle. 
The King's German Legion 10 cavalry was a different matter entirely. 
Considered by Wellington to be the only reliable cavalry at his disposal, the KGL 
was given the task of reconnaissance and protecting the frontier. The discipline 
of the KGL cavalry arm was much better than that of the British cavalry. That 
being the case, the KGL was able to execute its mission with a great deal more 
success than their British counterparts could. The KGL protected the frontier so 
well that the French never managed to penetrate it during the entire Peninsula 
campaign. This helped lead to the ultimate triumph of British forces in Spain by 
keeping the French intelligence officer's blind. Without military intelligence the 
French marshal's in Spain had to wait until Wellington acted. The French were, 
therefore, on the defensive while Wellington's army was able to seize the 
initiative. 
10 The Kings German Legion was formed when a Hanoverian army fled to England to escape French 
occupation of their homeland. Owing allegiance to King George the III as the Elector of Hanover this was 
not a mercenary band, but a highly trained and motivated force that was the equal of the British army. It 
was composed of infantry, cavalry, and artillery. 
After Napoleon was exiled to the island of Elba, the British began the 
process of downsizing the army. Thus, when Napoleon escaped and gathered 
an army to oppose the allies, the British did not have many veterans to send to 
Wellington. The entire campaign was decided by the Battle of Waterloo. The 
Battle of Waterloo was one of the most desperately fought battles in history. 
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How the battle itself was fought is unimportant; the outcome, however, is crucial. 
The Duke of Wellington defeated Napoleon, not with superior tactics nor with any 
secret weapons. Quite simply, the British infantry soldiers refused to accept 
defeat; they held on when other armies would have broken. The British soldiers 
held on long enough for a Prussian army under Field Marshal Blucher to arrive 
and save them from disaster. British officers saw it as Wellington's doing 
however, with most of them refusing to give the Prussians their due. For 
decades, the generals of Great Britain that commanded armies after 1815 stuck 
to what Wellington did because of the Battle of Waterloo. 
CHAPTER3 
THE WARS IN ASIA 
Queen Victoria's Little Wars: 
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England experienced an unprecedented period of peace from 1815 until 
the accession of Queen Victoria in 1837. From 1837 until 1901, Great Britain 
experienced continual warfare. These wars were small and rarely threatened the 
British Empire, but each war in its own way was important. In almost every war, 
the British soldier had an advantage, the advantage of superior technology. The 
generals rarely used new tactics however instead relying on the tactics 
Wellington used at Waterloo. This inability to adapt led to great disasters for the 
British army towards the end of the period. 
Wars in China 1840-1854: 
The first conflict between the Qing Dynasty that ruled China and the 
British Empire was called the Opium War. The war began when the Chinese 
government sent war junks to stop Chinese merchants from trading with British 
subjects at Hong Kong. Out of a fleet of twenty-nine war junks, four were sunk, 
while the two British frigates protecting Hong Kong suffered no damage. 11 An 
army composed of four thousand men was sent from India. The war did not last 
long, and the Chinese lost due to their inadequate weaponry. Equipped with 
ancient muskets and sometimes bows and arrows, the Chinese, even with 
superior numbers, were unable to stop the superbly equipped British. 
11 Byron Farwell Queen Victoria's Little Wars pg 16 
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The British regulars and marines carried the newly issued Brunswick 
musket, which was a percussion cap musket, and not a flintlock. The percussion 
caped musket uses a brass cap that contains the powder charge which ignites 
the powder in the barrel of the weapon. The greatest advantage of this system is 
that the percussion cap is waterproof. So the British regulars, but not the Indian 
Sepoys who still carried flintlocks, were able to fight in any weather. The sepoy's 
even had an advantage, as the flintlock musket was still more reliable than 
Chinese muskets. 
Since the Chinese outnumbered them the British generals in charge took 
the defensive when a battle was fought. The British, while conducting offensive 
campaigns, only attacked when facing forts and cities. The Opium War ended in 
August 1842, with the Chinese signing the Treaty of Nanjing. For the next twelve 
years the British government skirmished with pirates and occasionally with the 
Chinese government. 
The Sikh War: 
The Sikh's 12 army crossed the Sutlej on December 3, 1845. The 
estimated size of the Sikh army differs but a force of twelve thousand to twenty 
thousand soldiers is probably correct.13 Why the war started is a complicated 
affair, but most likely, when the British began massing troops on the border, the 
Sikhs interpreted this as hostile intentions and attacked first. The Sikh army was 
12 The term Sikh describes members of a Hindu sect that had created their own nation bordering British 
territory in India. 
13 Byron Farwell Queen Victoria's Little Wars pg 38 
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a well-trained army that fought with modern equipment and had been trained on 
the French army model by European officers. 
General Hugh Gough, a Peninsula veteran, commanded the British army. 
Having fought under the Duke of Wellington, Gough used primarily the same 
tactics. At the Battle of Mudki, on December 18, 1845, ten thousand British 
soldiers faced the Sikh army. The terrain around Mudki was mostly flat, but there 
were some areas of thick jungle where the Sikhs concealed their troops. The 
Sikhs opened fire at four o'clock in the morning and engaged in an artillery duel 
with the British. The British cavalry turned the Sikh's left flank forcing the Sikh 
army to withdraw. 14 Then on December 21, the two sides faced each other 
again. 
The Sikh army had entrenched itself at Ferozeshah. Gough deployed his 
army directly in front of the Sikh positions instead of attempting to flank the 
enemy positions. This proved to be a costly mistake for Gough's army. The first 
assault was bloodily repulsed, and it was only when Gough launched the entire 
army that the Sikhs were thrown back. General Gough, having served in the 
Peninsula, should have known that attacking a well-equipped entrenched enemy 
would be very costly. He had the same opinion of a native opponent that most 
British generals shared during the times. The general consensus was that no 
native army could ever defeat a European army. The battle of Ferozeshah 
14 Byron Farwell Queen Victoria's Little Wars pg 41 
eliminated that perception for many British soldiers, as the fighting here was 
particularly fierce. 
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There was one more battle left to fight before the war would end. A fresh 
Sikh army advanced on the exhausted British. The British won the battle when 
the Sikh commander interpreted the withdrawal of the cavalry as some form of 
deception. The First Sikh war to date had cost the British two thousand four 
hundred and fifteen men out of an army of around 18,000.15 The Sikhs retreated 
to their own territory but two weeks after the last battle ended, the Sikhs began 
raiding into Ludhiana. Once again British troops were dispatched to stop the 
Sikhs. The final battle occurred at Sobraon on February 10, 1846. The Sikhs 
had entrenched themselves on a bend of the river Sutlej. The battle began with 
a two hour-long artillery duel, but the British guns ran out of ammunition. So 
Gough launched his infantry in a frontal assault. The infantry charged, were 
repulsed, reformed and charged again. Eventually the Sikh artillery postions 
were taken, and then Gough released his cavalry. The Sikhs, with their back to 
the river, fought bravely and refused to surrender, but they were slaughtered. 
Estimates of Sikh casualties are around ten thousand; there is no accurate count 
since the British did not take one. British casualties were greater than any 
previous battle in the war, two thousand two hundred and eighty three men, 
including one major general, two brigadiers, and four colonels. 
15 Byron Farwell Queen Victoria's Little Wars pg 44 
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That was it for the Sikhs; Gough marched on the capital of Lahore and 
ended the war. It took Gough just fifty-four days to defeat the Sikhs and the 
peace terms were heavily favorable for the British. The price in lives is generally 
not considered in the final analysis. There the Gough could have done better. 
Had he not attacked directly at the Sikhs entrenched positions not as many 
British soldiers would not have died. 
Crimean War: 1854-55: 
The British Empire dispatched five infantry divisions and a cavalry division 
to fight with French, Turkish, and Sardinian allies against the Russians. 
Equipped with the best arms the empire could buy with the best training possible, 
these troops were not veterans from India. Most of the troops had never seen a 
battlefield or fired their weapons while taking fire. The Crimean War would 
become one of the worst run campaigns in military history. The British army 
composed the best troops the empire had to offer, and some of the senior 
officers had served Wellington himself. 
The British soldier carried the Brunswick percussion cap musket, which 
had been adopted by the army a few years earlier. The cavalry was still saved 
for massed charges, and the artillery was composed of smooth bore guns. 
Lieutenant General Lord Raglan, who had been at the Battle of Waterloo and 
who had never previously commanded troops in the field, commanded the army. 
This was an ominous beginning for the British army. The entire campaign 
centered around the port city of Sebastopol; every move the British and their 
allies undertook was made to take Sebastopol. 
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The wars in the east however had not influenced military doctrine. Lord 
Raglan had a very low opinion of any 'Sepoy'16 officers so there were very few 
experienced officers within Lord Raglan's staff or throughout the army. The army 
could have benefited from the lessons those officers had learned against the 
Sikhs, and Chinese, but unfortunately the army would have to make due with 
inexperience throughout the officer corp. Owing to this, Lord Raglan stayed true 
to the British mentality of driving straight up the middle. 
When the British army landed, it began the long trek to Sebastopol. This 
was quickly reported to the Russian commander who moved his thirty-eight 
thousand troops to intercept them at a place called Alma. 17 Thus the Battle of 
Alma was fought between the British, French and Turks, against the Russians on 
September 20, 1854. The battle quickly became a confused affair, with the 
British infantry advancing too quickly and having to stop and wait for the French 
to catch up. All the while, the infantry was under heavy bombardment from 
Russian artillery positioned on hills, which the British heaviest gun, the nine 
pound smooth bore cannon, was unable to target due to the range and elevation. 
Even though the French turned the Russian left flank, and the British Light 
division stormed the Russian Great Redoubt in a frontal assault, the Russians 
were able to remove all but one cannon before the British took the fortification. 
The Russians counterattacked and retook the redoubt, driving off the 
British light division and checking the French and the British Highland and 
16 'Sepoy' Officer was a term used for any officers that had commanded or fought native troops. 
17 Alan Palmer The Banner of Battle p 97 
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Guards divisions. The battle had now swung in favor of the Russians, but the 
British artillery on another part of the battlefield decided the Battle of Alma. Lord 
Ragland and his staff stumbled upon a promontory that overlooked the Great 
Redoubt and telegraph hill. A few members of Ragland's staff left and came 
back with a couple of nine pound guns but no artillerists to run them. 18 The staff 
officers operated the guns themselves, until a full battery complete with crews 
was able to scale the heights and begin firing on Russian positions. It was this 
battery that scored a lucky hit on an ammunition wagon, which of course 
exploded and convinced the Russian commander to begin pulling back his 
troops. 
The British and their allies did not follow up on the victory, and the 
Russian army escaped. After a few days, the allies began to march on 
Sebastopol and to set up a forward base at Balaclava. It was from this base that 
supplies and most importantly, siege guns were put ashore for the siege of 
Sebastopol. The siege guns the British used were mostly naval guns from the 
ships of the line 19 offshore. All massive guns, the largest being sixty-eight 
pounders, these guns were supposed to reduce Sebastopol's defenses to dust. 
The siege was not a short affair, and the Russians were able to keep the British 
and their allies at bay with some effort. 
With Sevastopol under siege, the Russian field army attempted to relieve 
the city by attacking British positions east of the harbor on October 25, 1854. 
18 Alan Palmer The Banner of Battle p 101 
19 Ship of the Line: term used to describe a battleship in the age of sail. British ships of the line had from 
sixty four to one hundred and twenty guns a side. 
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General Sir Colin Campbell commanded the British positions which, consisted of 
Turkish militia, Royal Marines, and the 93rd Highlanders. The Turkish militia fled 
before the Russian troops after a heroic defense, while the 93rd Highlanders 
made a stand against Russian cavalry. Unable to form square, the 93rd simply 
formed a two rank deep line, and stood back to back. The Russian cavalry was 
unable to drive past the 93rd , which gave Lord Raglan time to move his troops. 
The 1st and 4th divisions left their trenches and moved to the plain to protect 
Balaclava. At this point the Russian army, which had captured the redoubts the 
Turkish troops had been protecting, went on the defensive. The British heavy 
brigade of cavalry now charged, catching the Russian cavalry that were checked 
by the 93rd off guard. The British cavalry won the engagement but were too 
disorganized to pursue the fleeing Russians. 
The battle then quieted and the Russians began to remove British naval 
guns that had been captured earlier in the day. Lord Raglan ordered the cavalry 
to try to recover the guns. The cavalry commander was not able to see the entire 
battlefield as Lord Raglan could so he did not follow the first order. So a second 
order was sent. However, the staff officer who delivered the order pointed 
towards Russian entrenched artillery batteries when asked where the guns were. 
The light brigade charged the Russian guns and managed to reach the Russian 
positions. The charge destroyed the battery but the light brigade suffered heavy 
casualties. The battle ended with the Russians holding the redoubts they had 
captured in the morning and achieving the weakening of the British siege lines 
around Sevastopol. 
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The last major battle to be fought in the war was the Battle of lnkerman. 
Victory in this particular battle did not rest with any great tactics or superior 
weapons, but rather on the fighting spirit of the common soldier. On November 
5, the Russians launched an early morning assault. In all, sixty thousand 
Russian troops and two hundred and thirty four guns were involved in the 
assault.20 The Russian plan was to attack British positions on Cossack Mountain 
and from Chorgun another hilltop, while the Sebastopol garrison occupied the 
British forward trenches. Unfortunately, the weather made the plan impossible to 
carry out from the beginning. 
The British troops were taken by surprise at this early morning assault and 
the response to the attack was sluggish. A small part of General Sir George 
Brown's light division arrived as quickly as possible and engaged the Russian 
Ekaterinburgsky regiment. The British troops quickly fixed bayonets, charged, 
and checked the Ekaterinburgsky regiment in a general melee. The fog cleared 
some time later, and British sharpshooters quickly killed the Russian general 
leading the assault. The Russian regiment fell back, but counterattacks by small 
numbers of British troops would happen throughout the day. 
The British brought up the guards21 regiments with the belief that they 
could stop the Russian troops. The guardsmen suffered heavy casualties from 
20 Alan Palmer The Banner of Battle p 151 
21 The guard's regiments consisted of the Coldstream Guards, Grenadier Guards, Scots Guards, and Scot 
Fusiliers. The term 'guard' generally refers to the best troops an army has. This is true for the British army 
as well. The Guard Regiments are the best of the best, incredibly loyal, fierce fighters, with discipline and 
bravery that few soldiers ever show. When the British army wanted something accomplished at all cost the 
guardsmen usually got the job. 
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several charges, and the Duke of Cambridge was soon seeking reinforcements 
to hold back the Russian troops. A gap some seven hundred yards across had 
been created in the British lines near the Sandbag Battery22. The gap had to be 
filled but by whom? General Sir George Cathcart decided to accomplish this feat 
with six hundred men. General Cathcart made a terrible mistake, though his 
initial charge was very successful. He ordered the Scot Fusiliers to charge but 
Cathcart and his men were quickly surrounded because the Russian 
commanders had eight thousand men intent on punching through this gap. 
The Grenadier Guards still held the Sandbag Battery, but they were 
desperately outnumbered. Victory seemed within the Russian armies hands, 
until two French regiments charged the leading Russian columns in the flank, 
forcing the Russians to break off the engagement against the Grenadier Guards. 
Still, the weight of numbers forced the French, and British troops around the 
Sandbag Battery back, and the Russians captured three guns. With that, the 
Russian troops hesitated long enough for two thousand French reinforcements to 
arrive and check the Russian assault. There would still be fighting as the 
Russians attempted to hold onto what they had captured, but ultimately, the allies 
retook all the ground the Russian had gained that day. The battle had lasted 
eight hours, with the British suffering two thousand five hundred men dead or 
22 The Sandbag Battery was aptly named by the British because it was a fortified area consenting only of 
sandbags, that was about ten feet high, and able to hold two guns. It was also the scene of the fiercest 
hand-to-hand fighting seen in the entire war. 
wounded. The Brigade of the Guards suffered very heavy casualties, with only 
two hundred men fit for duty out of one thousand three hundred men. 
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This battle made it clear that the Russians could not relieve the city, nor 
could the allies assault the city. Neither side had the numbers to accomplish 
their respective tasks. Sevastopol would hold out for many more months, but the 
Russian army never attempted to lift the siege around the city again. Sevastopol 
fell on September 9, 1855; the main objective of the Allies was accomplished. 
Fighting would continue till April 2, 1856, when news reached the Crimea that the 
Treaty of Paris had been signed. 
This war was quite possibly the worst run campaign in British military 
history, and not one officer saw anything wrong with the tactics. After all, the 
British had won every battle that they fought with the Russians. Medical 
conditions did become a particular concern for the Queen Victoria after the war, 
which may explain why the British army attempted reform the medical services in 
the coming years. 
The Sepoy Mutiny of 1857 
In 1857, the sepoy troops in India mutinied over the use of new 
ammunition. With this new ammunition, a soldier had to tear the end of the 
cartridge for use. The new cartridges were supposed to be greased with mutton 
fat, but suppliers used either beef or pork grease to cut costs. While not of great 
importance to Europeans, to those of the Hindu or Muslim faiths, this posed a 
religious dilemma. Hindus will not eat the fat of a cow, and Muslims cannot eat 
the fat of the pig. The officers in India took immediate steps to placate the native 
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troops by removing the ammunition and instigating a new musket drill where the 
cartridge was ripped open with one's fingers. The measures were too little, and 
too late, to stop the mutiny of already disgruntled troops. 
The technology used in the Sepoy Mutiny had vastly improved since the 
Crimean War. Instead of the Brunswick musket, the European troops used the 
newly issued Enfield rifle. The Enfield rifle had a rifled barrel instead of a smooth 
bore barrel and was a .557 caliber rifle. This meant that the Enfield rifle could fire 
farther than the firearms used by the mutineers.23 The Enfield used the 
percussion cap system of setting for firing the weapon, which meant that the 
British troops' chance of a misfire was greatly reduced. To load the weapon, the 
paper cartridge still had to be torn open and the powder and bullet inside, along 
with the paper rammed down the barrel. The Enfield was also light, only 
weighing one hundred and thirty eight ounces. Combined with how easy it was 
to handle, the British soldier quickly became fond of the weapon.24 
In the matter of artillery, the British did not possess such an advantage. 
The mutineers often had larger cannons and more of them than the besieged 
British troops. The mutineers were also able to repair old cannons that were 
believed unusable by the British and use them to great effect. The British artillery 
had one advantage over the native artillery, as some of the British guns were 
rifled. Rifled artillery was a new weapon to the British army, and the rifled guns 
were small with three-pound guns being typical. These rifled cannons were able 
23 The mutineers were armed with the Brunswick musket, also a percussion capped weapon and many 
British regiments had not received their new weapons when the mutiny started. 
24 Graham Smith Military Small Arms p124 
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to deliver fire much more accurately than guns of the same size. British 
artillerymen were also better trained and possessed superior morale over their 
mutineer counterparts. British gunners did not abandon their guns, but instead if 
the guns could not be destroyed or removed, the gunners died at their positions 
attempting to save their guns 
The native troops also had superior swords, called tulwars, in their 
possession. The tulwar was a razor sharp sword that without much effort could 
cleave a human skull or the breastplate worn by some native mutineers. British 
swords often bent when they hit a breastplate and could not maintain a cutting 
edge like the tulwar.25 The tulwar sword caused the majority of melee wounds 
received by British soldiers during the conflict. Loyal native troops, most notably 
the Sikhs, carried the tulwar as well, using it to great effect against the mutineers. 
The fighting during the mutiny centered around the cities of Deli, Lucknow, 
and Cawnpore, this area being the location of the majority of Bengal troops who 
were the main instigators of the mutiny. The mutiny began on May 10, 1857, in 
Meerut and quickly spread from there. The siege of Cawnpore by the mutineers 
and what happened there would cause the British government to send 
overwhelming force to deal with the situation. 
Cawnpore had very few European troops under the command of Brigadier 
General Sir Hugh Massy Wheeler. Wheeler's command of European troops 
consisted of about three hundred and fifty soldiers as well as a twenty-four pound 
25 Indian metallurgy was superior to that of the British practices of the time. British iron and steel at this 
time was considered of a poor quality. 
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howitzer, five nine pound guns, and three rifled three pound guns.26 Opposing 
this small force were almost three thousand mutineers.27 General Wheeler had 
not anticipated the mutineers to attack him at Cawnpore, but rather he expected 
the mutineers would march to Delhi. When the attack commenced on June 6, 
1857, the British troops had not brought in much food, and the only water supply 
was a well that the mutineers were able to fire on with musket and canister shot. 
Wheeler placed his artillery in exposed positions, since there had not been 
time to entrench the guns.28 These positions were under fire all day from 
artillery, and at night the mutineers would attempt to get troops close enough to 
fire muskets into the positions. Due to this, the British had to sleep during the 
day and prepare for assaults at night. The British troops managed to hold out till 
June 26, when the mutineer's commander sent a party to discuss terms of 
surrender. The mutineers offered Wheeler very favorable terms, and it was 
decided to surrender on June 27, 1857. 
The British dully marched out that morning and proceeded to boats that 
the mutineers had supplied to carry the British to Allahabad. The mutineers had 
tricked Wheeler though and as soon as the British troops and European civilians 
reached the boats, the mutineers opened fire at point blank range. Very few 
26 Byron Farwell Queen Victoria's Little Wars, pg 101, Thomson Captain Mowbray The Story of 
Cawnpore pp 63 
27Byron Farwell Queen Victoria's Little Wars, pg 101 
28 There was no time since General Wheeler did not believe reports that the Sepoys were mutinying 
elsewhere. 
33 
soldiers survived the treachery and reached British lines. The mutineers took 
about one hundred and twenty five European women and children as hostages.29 
When a British relief column retook Cawnpore in July 1857, they found 
remains of all the hostages buried in the well. Upon knowledge of this massacre, 
the British troops under siege at Lucknow decided that there would be no 
surrender. One thousand seven hundred and twenty European and loyal sepoy 
troops defended Lucknow against thirty thousand mutineers.30 The European 
troops defended the British Residency in Lucknow which they had stocked with 
food, thirty artillery pieces, and a plentiful supply of ammunition, after quickly 
building improvised fortifications. The defenders of the Residency were under 
continuous fire from the mutineers barely fifty yards away. The British tactics at 
this particular siege were not inventive; sorties were made to destroy houses 
opposite the defenses and do as much harm as possible, while still providing an 
adequate defense for the residency and awaiting rescue. 
Brigadier General Henry Havelock led a rescue operation consisting of 
fewer than two thousand troops. Havelock first had to fight his way through 
Maharaja Dhoondoo Punth's force that had betrayed the garrison of Cawnpore. 
Punth's force was estimated around twelve thousand and they were strongly 
entrenched along the Grand Turk, Cawnpore road junction. Havelock studied the 
mutineer positions and launched a flank attack, as attacking the 'front' would be 
devastating to Havelock's small force. The British skirmishers were able to keep 
29 Byron Farwell, Queen Victoria's Little Wars, pg 101 
30 D.A. Kinsley, They fight like devils p 21, the British defenders were eventually reduced to around 980 
men. 
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the mutineer cavalry at bay, at a range of a thousand yards with the Enfield rifle, 
while the British artillery attempted to take out the four twenty-four pound guns 
that protected the weak point in the mutineer lines. 
The British guns were too small to accomplish this task so an infantry 
attack was ordered to take the guns. The 78th Highlanders led this infantry 
assault and their, bagpipe music apparently terrified the mutineers. The assault 
succeeded and the guns were taken.31 The next obstacle was a fortified village 
that the 78th Highlanders captured in a bayonet charge.32 The flank attack wore 
on and the mutineers were defeated, with the British suffering one hundred and 
fifty dead or wounded, while the mutineers lost around two hundred and fifty 
men, with the number wounded unknown, and twenty-four guns were taken.33 
Havelock drove towards Lucknow but was stopped due to casualties, 
mostly from disease, until reinforcements could be sent to him. When General 
Havelock received the reinforcements, for which he was waiting, Havelock fought 
his was way into the Residency in Lucknow on September 26, 1847.34 The 
Residency's occupants were not saved; they were merely reinforced, by the 
arrival of Havelock's troops. 
The reinforcements allowed the besieged British troops to strengthen and 
extend their defensive lines. Certain problems were created by the arrival of 
31 The regiment in question was the 78th Hihlanders; also known as the Queens Own Highlanders. The 
mutineers mistook the kilts worn by the 78 for petticoats and thought the regiment was composed of 
eunuchs. 
32 D.A. Kinsley. They fight like devils p39 
33 D.A. Kinsley. They fight like devils p 43 
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General Havelock's troops. The most critical of these problems was food for the 
besieged Europeans. General Havelock had brought troops, artillery and 
ammunition, but little food, and Lucknow's defenders were running low on food 
after eighty-seven days. 
The British artillery was still found wanting during the siege. There were 
not enough heavy guns to silence enemy batteries, which were maintained at 
some distance to take advantage of the British lack of heavy guns. General 
Havelock had left behind all the heavy guns his army had captured, so his 
advance could move more quickly. To bring some relief from the mutineers' 
artillery, raids were stepped up against the enemy artillery positions. These raids 
did destroy several enemy guns. 
The Residency garrison had to wait until Lieutenant General Sir Colin 
Campbell arrived with a second relief force before they could evacuate Lucknow. 
After evacuating the Lucknow garrison and all European noncombatants, 
Campbell withdrew to prepare a force sufficient enough to retake Lucknow. 
General Campbell gathered a force of thirty one thousand Inda-European troops 
and one hundred and sixty-four guns to face one hundred and thirty thousand 
rebel troops and sixty four guns garrisoned within the most fortified city in lndia.35 
To accomplish the task of capturing Lucknow, Campbell divided his forces in half 
and attacked in a pincer movement, attacking the flanking defenses of the city 
while not allowing the rebels to outmaneuver him. The battle for the city began 
34 D.A. Kinsley, They fight like devils p 43 
35 D.A. Kinsley, They Fight Like Devils p 214 
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on March 6, 1858, and ended on March 16, 1858.36 Campbell moved very 
methodically during the attack so that casualties on the British side would not be 
very heavy. When the rebels abandoned Lucknow, the Indian mutiny was for the 
most part over. With the end of the rebellion in India, the British Army turned to 
fighting in the Orient. The most notable conflict was the Third China war of 1860. 
There was a great innovation in technology for this war, as it was the first time 
that the British Army used breech loading rifled artillery pieces. 37 Later 
politicians decided that the breechloaders were too expensive to make so they 
discontinued production of these fine weapons. 
Weapons technology continued to improve during the late 1850s and early 
1860s, especially within the United States. The British government watched the 
innovations that occurred before and during the American Civil War with great 
interest. The breech loading rifle and the machine gun were introduced during 
this time. The first breech loading weapons were introduced as experimental 
weapons in 1857 to the cavalry. There were four types of these breech-loading 
carbines being experimented with. Two of these were British, the Terry carbine 
and the Westley Richards, and two were American designs, the Sharps, and 
Greene carbines. 
The Sharps carbine, which was a percussion cap firearm, had an easily 
operated loading mechanism. The trigger guard was pushed down which 
36 D.A. Kinsley, They Fight Like Devils p 214: The battle for the city of Lucknow lasted till March 16, 
1858. 
37 Byron Farwell. Queen Victoria's Little Wars p 141 These guns were named Armstrong guns after their 
creator, and received high marks from officers in the field. 
opened the breech, then a paper cartridge was inserted into the chamber, and 
the breech was closed by pushing up on the trigger guard, which tore open the 
cartridge at one end.38 Once fired, there was nothing to remove as the paper 
and powder had been burned away but residue would build up after prolonged 
firing of the weapon, sometimes causing the weapon to jam. This mechanism 
allowed a fast rate of fire. The Greene carbine used a fixed breech, with the 
barrel rotating and moving forward for loading.39 It was not a popular weapon 
and was never even issued to troops. 
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The Westley Richards capping breech-loading carbine had a complicated 
loading mechanism. The breech was opened and closed by a hinged long arm. 
Raising the arm vertically opened the breech and moved a plunger with a breech 
plug attached to the front. The army Westley Richards for cavalry use in 1861.40 
While this armed the cavalry with breech loading weapons the infantry still fought 
with muzzle loading rifles. After the Prussian wars with Denmark and Austria in 
the middle of the 1860s, during which the Prussians used the bolt-action needle 
gun it was apparent to the British Army that the muzzleloader was obsolete. 
A committee was formed to study designs for equipping the entire army 
with breech-loaders.41 The committee approved the Snider rifle for one important 
reason, the army's current Enfield rifles could be converted to the breech loading 
system at little cost. The Snider-Enfield was used until the adaptation of a true 
38 Ivan Hogg, Weapons of the Civil Warp 13 
39 H.C.B. Rogers Weapons of the British Soldier p236 
40 H.C.B. Rogers Weapons of the British Soldier p 237 
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breech-loading rifle in 1871. The rifle selected was the Martini-Henry rifle, which 
sported a lever that when pushed down opened the breech, ejected the spent 
cartridge, and a new cartridge was inserted by hand. The major flaw of the 
Martini-Henry rifle was that it was not equipped with a magazine. Against a 
numerically superior enemy this could become a fatal flaw for the troops carrying 
the Martini-Henry. The Martini-Henry rifle also had the tendency to overheat 
which fowled the gun, making it useless for firing. 
41 The committee looked for a system that could convert all the existing Enfield rifles to breechloaders thus 
saving the government money. 
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CHAPTER4 
THE WARS IN AFRICA 
The wars that took place in Africa are of particular interest for several 
reasons. First of all, there is the change in weapons technology. The British 
begin the fighting in Africa using single shot breech loading weapons and by the 
end are using magazine feed rifles and water-cooled machine guns. Second, 
there is the challenge that each opponent gave the British, even though for the 
most part the British had an overwhelming technological superiority. Third there 
is what the British Army learns from each experience and how it applies this 
knowledge to each subsequent war. 
The Zulu War: 
The British army had a tremendous technological advantage over the 
Zulus during the Zulu War of 1879. Armed with the Martini Henry breech-loading 
rifle, the typical British infantryman was more than a match for a Zulu warrior with 
his spear and shield. The British army also had cannons and a new weapon that 
had only been used in combat on a limited, the Gatling gun. The Gatling gun 
was an early form of a machine gun developed in the United States during the 
American Civil War. Though it would see combat during that conflict it was not 
used on a grand scale, the Gatling gun was a leap ahead in weapon 
technology.42 The Gatling gun, designed by Richard J Gatling, consisted of six 
barrels that were turned with a hand crank with the rotation allowing the barrel to 
42 Dick, Nolan. Benjamin Franklin Bulter The Damnedest Yankee p. 280 
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cool when it was not being fired.43 The weapon used metallic cartridges; a 
helical cam drove the bolts forward when the barrel reached the top position. As 
a barrel moved to the six o'clock position, the firing pin was cocked and the bolt 
closed, preparing it for firing. After firing, the spent cartridge was ejected and the 
barrel was ready to be reloaded.44 
With such weapons the British could not believe they could lose a battle to 
the Zulus, but British tactics led to one of the worst defeats ever suffered by the 
British army. General Lord Frederick Augustus Thesiger Chelmsford 
commanded the British army that invaded Zululand. Chelmsford divided his 
force into three columns for the invasion. The right flank column, commanded by 
Colonel Charles Knight Pearson consisted of the second battalion, 3rd regiment 
of foot, and six companies of the 99th regiment of the foot. These troops were 
the backbone of the column. The right column also had two seven-pound 
cannons, engineers, mounted infantry and two battalions of native infantry. 
Chelmsford commanded the center column, consisting of two battalions of the 
20th regiment of the foot, six artillery pieces, mounted infantry, engineers, and 
two battalions of native infantry, for a total strength of 4,709 men. The left 
column, commanded by Colonel Evelyn Wood, VC, consisted of the 90th 
regiment of the foot and a battalion of the 13th regiment of the foot, six cannons, 
and cavalry for a total force of 2,278 men. 
43 Ivan, Hogg Weapons of the Civil Warp. 53 
44 Ivan Hogg Weapons of the Civil Warp 53-55, Fast firing weapons such as the Gatling gun have the 
flaw of overheating on the rotating barrel system solved that problem. The Gatling gun could fire up to 800 
rounds a minute. 
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The invasion occurred on January 11, 1879, with British troops crossing 
the border into Zululand. The Zulus could oppose the British forces with 50,000 
warriors, armed with a short stabbing spear called the iKlwa and a large ox hide 
shield. These warriors ran barefooted and could cover fifty miles a day, which 
was much farther than British Imperial troops could travel.45 The Zulus wanted 
peace and marched to meet the British army very slowly, hoping that the British 
would leave Zulu territory. 
The center column had marched to a place called lsandhlwana, where on 
January 21, 1879, it made camp. Chelmsford made the decision not to laager 
the camp.46 This decision went against the advice of the Boer advisors that 
accompanied the center column; it would prove to be a fatal decision for many of 
the general's men. On January 22, 1879, a force of 20,000 Zulu warriors 
attacked the British camp at lsandhlwana. Chelmsford had taken half his force 
from the camp marching to support some of his native troops that he had 
detached the previous day. Lieutenant Colonel Anthony W. Dunford had ridden 
into the camp and as the senior ranking officer had taken command. Dunford 
received a report that Zulus had been seen marching against Chelmsford's flank. 
In fact, this was the left horn of the Zulu army beginning to encircle the British 
troops.47 Dunford marched out of camp with his native troops to support 
45 David, Clammer The Zulu Warp 20-21 
46 Laagering the camp was simply circling the supply wagons and creating a fortified camp of sorts. 
47 The Zulus standard tactic was to have a diversionary force known as the chest attack the enemy from the 
front while two horns flanked the enemy formation and cut off any escape root. Only a laager could protect 
against this form of attack. Since there were no flanks to turn, the Zulu forces would not be able to attack 
their enemies from the rear and flanks 
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Chelmsford while Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Henry B. Pulleine stayed to defend 
the camp with the first battalion of the 24th regiment of the foot. When the Zulu 
'chest' came into sight, Pulleine still had time to form a tight defensive position 
within the camp. The Colonel marched towards the Zulus instead, leaving a gap 
between his line and that of Colonel Dunford. The Zulus advanced and began 
firing some rifles at the British troops who quickly returned fire. The Zulu fire was 
for the most part ineffective while the British fire was devastating. So devastating 
was the British fire that the frontal attack by the Zulus stopped, and the British 
ceased fire. Then, after about fifteen minutes had passed, the Zulu horns 
attacked the undefended camp. Dunford's native troops were now running low 
on ammunition, and the British quartermasters would not re-supply them on the 
grounds that the ammunition belonged to the 24th Regiment. The Natal natives 
wavered and broke as the Zulus charged. The British officers of the 24th 
Regiment sounded the retreat, but it was too late. The Royal Artillery crews 
attempted to save their two cannons and managed to retreat past the camp, 
where they encountered more Zulus and died defending their guns. The British 
regulars fought to the last but of the British officers and enlisted personnel that 
began the battle, 858 died, along with an estimated 500 native troops. What 
exactly happened after the Zulus got within the camp is not known, as no one 
who did not try to escape as soon as it happened was left alive to relate their 
tale. 
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A day later, at a mission known as Rorke's Drift another battle was fought. 
This time the battle was between 4,000 Zulus and 104 effective British soldiers 
and officers, with the British troops deployed in a defensive position.48 The 
commanding officer of the troops at Rorke's Drift was not Lieutenant Gonville 
Bromhead who was in command of the detachment of regulars left at the 
mission, but rather Lieutenant John R. M. Chard of the Royal Engineers who was 
senior to Bromhead. That being the case, upon learning that the Zulus were on 
their way and what had happened to the central column Lieutenant Chard began 
to fortify the camp.49 The defenses went up as quickly as possible and though 
mistakes were made, Rorke's Drift became a virtual fortress. 50 Sometime after 
5:00 p.m. on January 21, 1879, the Zulus attacked Rorke's Drift. 
The Zulus had surrounded the mission and outnumbered the British nearly 
forty to one. The Zulu tactic was simply to charge the British time and again 
while those few Zulus who had rifles fired on the British from the Oscarberg 
48 David Clammer The Zulu War Appendix E p 225 
49 At this point Lt. Chard and Lt. Bromhead had discussed abandoning the mission and attempting to escape 
the Zulu attack with the number of sick and wounded as well as necessary supplies that would have had to 
be taken with them. Both Lt. Chard and Lt. Bromhead with a little help from the sergeant major in the 
camp realized that it was not possible to out run the Zulu troops and that the British would have to make a 
stand within the mission. There is evidence that the defense was not organized by the two officers at all but 
by Commissary Officer James Dalton, the before mentioned sergeant major. 
50 Most notably the water wagon was apparently left outside of the defensive perimeter and that night the 
British had to retrieve it with a bayonet charge. 
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heights. The Zulus numbers began to o'1erwhelm the British who had to fall back 
to the interior defensive line, and then the hospital was lost. The hospital caught 
fire, illuminating the area, and giving a significant advantage to the British. The 
Zulu warriors stopped attacking sometime after 2:00 a.m., but when day broke, 
the British soldiers saw just how many Zulu warriors were opposing them. 51 The 
battle ended in the morning with General Chelmsford arriving with the survivors 
of the central column. It is estimated that the British within Rorke's Drift fired 
twenty thousand rounds of ammunition, and for the many acts of heroism eleven 
Victoria Crosses were awarded for this one battle alone. 
When news reached England about the disaster at lsandlwana and the 
amazing victory at Rorke's Drift, the British government responded with typical 
Victorian manners. It sent overwhelming reinforcements to Chelmsford, while Lt. 
Chard, and Lt. Bromhead became national heroes.52 Chelmsford fortified 
Rorke's Drift, Colonel Pearson entrenched himself at Eshowe, and Colonel Wood 
laagered his troops where they were. 
General Chelmsford began to build up supplies and troops for his next 
push in Zululand proper, while Colonels Pearson and Wood were continuing to 
be a thorn in the Zulus sides. The first move by the Zulus did not come until late 
51 At day break the surviving Zulu warriors stood up out of rifle range showing the British their true 
numbers. Most of the British troops thought that they were done for but the Zulus simply turned and 
walked away. They left an estimated 1,000 dead warriors on the field; no official count was ever taken, 
while the British only suffered fifteen dead with almost the entire force having some form of a wound. 
52 Queen Victoria promoted them by royal decree two full grades, so they both became Majors within the 
army. The overwhelming reinforcements amounted to 10,500 men, which included three batteries of 
artillery, two cavalry regiments and six battalions of British regulars. 
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March, and it came against Wood. The Zulus had roughly the same numbers 
they did at lsandlwana, however, they were now armed with close to one 
thousand Martini-Henry rifles and carried plenty of ammunition. The newly 
promoted Brigadier General Wood attacked a Zulu chief at Hlobane on March 29, 
1879, under orders from Chelmsford, but the attack did not go well. To make 
matters worse, the Zulu army that King Cetshwayo had sent out to attack Wood 
arrived during Wood's attack on Hlobane. Seeing that his way back to his 
fortified base was about to be cut off, Wood ordered a withdrawal. It became a 
race to see who was faster, the Zulu army or the British raiding force. Most of 
Wood's force made it back to the fortified camp at Kambula. 
Woods' camp was situated upon a ridge top. There were four fortified 
positions. The main camp was almost two hundred yards across, the secondary 
camp was close to forty yards across, and between these positions was an 
entrenched battery of artillery. A large cattle kraal was in close proximity to the 
artillery position.53 Wood had under his command two thousand and eighty six 
men. The attack from the main Zulu army came on March 30, 1879, around 
12:45 p.m. The Zulus quickly surrounded the British camp on three sides, setting 
up a deadly crossfire. The British troops positioned within the cattle kraal were 
taking heavy losses and began to withdraw, when Wood ordered a bayonet 
charge. Many of the British soldiers who charged were shot, but they drove off 
53 Each area consisted of chained heavy wagons, earthen walls, trenches, and wooden palisades. 
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the Zulus for a short time.54 Still the Zulus took the cattle kraal, but when two 
British companies charged them, the Zulu broke and ran. The fighting had lasted 
over four hours before the British horsemen charged and the Zulus were driven 
off_ss 
The next battle against the Zulu army, at a place called Gingindhlovu, was 
fought by Chelmsford's force of five thousand six hundred and seventy on its way 
to relieve Pearson at Eshowe facing a Zulu army of ten thousand.56 This was the 
first battle in the campaign when Gatling guns would be used. On April 1, the 
Zulu commander ordered an attack on the fortified British camp. The Zulus 
charged, and when they were within three hundred yards, the British camp 
opened fire. 57 Only a handful of Zulus got within twenty yards of the British 
camp, and only a ten-year-old boy managed to get within the laager. After an 
hour and twenty minutes of fighting, the Zulus were routed.58 Chelmsford 
relieved the force at Eshowe and escorted them back to Natal. With the end of 
that battle there remained but one objective, the Zulu capital of Ulundi. The 
Battle of Ulundi differed from other battles fought in the Zulu war in two ways. 
The first was that the British revisited an old tactic, the square, and secondly the 
battle was fought in the open. It would take months for the last battle to be 
fought as Chelmsford built up troops and supplies. The British Parliament grew 
54 At this point Brigadier General Wood believed that had the Zulus charged from all three sides the British 
would have been overrun. 
55 Robert, Edgerton, Like Lions They Fought p128 
56 Robert, Edgerton Like Lions They Fought p 131 
57 The majority of the British regulars were newly recruited troops who had never seen battle before. Due 
to this fact, many of them forgot to lower their sights, which were set for 1,000 yards. 
58 Robert, Edgerton Like Lions They Fought p 134 
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impatient with General Chelmsford's delays and so replaced him with General Sir 
Garnet Wolsely, but Chelmsford decided to attack the Zulu capital before 
General Wolsely could arrive from England to take command. 59 
Chelmsford divided his force into three columns of advance and 
proceeded to the capital city of Ulundi with the intention of fighting a large battle 
in the open to restore his reputation. The force that Chelmsford personally led 
consisted of five thousand three hundred and seventeen soldiers, twelve 
cannons, and two Gatling guns. The British troops formed into a massive square 
in the morning and marched to a spot that General Chelmsford had chosen. The 
Zulu army, which numbered 20,000, was very confident that they could defeat 
the British in the open.60 This was wishful thinking for the Zulus. The British 
square was not broken, and at the right moment General Chelmsford loosed his 
lancers upon the retreating Zulus, thereby completing his victory. The city of 
Ulundi was burned to the ground; the Zulu army had been destroyed and would 
never again reassemble. The war was over. 
The British Army should have learned an important lesson during this war 
about the benefits of defensive firepower. At the Battle of Rorke's Drift, the 
fortifications that the British had hastily made allowed the one hundred fit soldiers 
to hold off the much larger Zulu force. In every battle after Rorke's Drift, the 
British fixed defensive positions and along with rapid firing weapons, they 
stopped the Zulu forces from overrunning the British defenses. The lesson was 
59 General Wolseley would eventually rise to the rank of Field Marshall and Commander in Chief of the 
British Army. 
60 Robert Edgerton Like Lions They Fought p 151 
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not learned though because the Zulus were so technologically inferior the British 
did not consider the devastation that could be wrought on their own troops if they 
attacked defensive positions of a well-equipped enemy. The fighting in Africa 
was far from over, and the next opponents that the British would fight were 
Europeans who did not fight in a conventional way but with guerrilla tactics. 
The South African War 
The South African War was both short and humiliating for the British Army. 
The enemy this time, the Boers, were of European descent and though they were 
inadequately equipped with Westly-Ricard rifles and had no artillery, they fought 
in a much different way than the British did. They fought a guerrilla war. Except 
for surrounding isolated British outposts, the Boers would make hit and run 
attacks against British relief columns. The British commanders were unable to 
adjust to these tactics. 
The South African war began on December 16, 1880, and ended on 
March 22, 1881. The Boers began the conflict by surrounding British forts. Then 
using their best troops, they; took up a defensive position along the route the 
British would have to take to relieve the besieged outposts. The first action came 
about on December 20, 1880, at a place called Bronkhorstpruit.61 The British 
forces numbered 263 officers and soldiers while the Boers had nearly 1,000 men. 
The Boers, who were well concealed, ambushed the British; the action lasted 
only half an hour and was a massacre. 
61 Brian Bond, Victorian Military Campaigns p210 
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By January, the Boers had given the initiative to the British and only 
reacted to British advances. General George Pomeroy-Colley, the commander-
in-chief of British forces in Transvaal, began to gather a force to relieve the 
surrounded British outposts. In January, Colley gathered around 1,000 men and 
marched to Laing's Nek where approximately 2,000 Boers troops were strongly 
positioned. On January 28, 1880, Colley attacked a weak point in the Boer line 
which allowed him to outflank the rest of the defenses the Boers had created. 
The plan of attack was simple. Calley's artillery would pin down the majority of 
the Boers, while his infantry and cavalry attacked a lightly defended spur. The 
cavalry attacked too soon and was halted by very accurate rifle fire, and when 
the British infantry reached the top of their assigned slope, they were not only 
attacked from the front but on their unguarded flank as well. The attack failed 
miserably and Colley retired to his camp at Mount Prospect only a few miles 
away to await reinforcements. The final battle of the war took place on February 
27, 1881, on the summit of Majuba. The British had scaled the slope of Majuba 
during the night with only three companies of soldiers, which consisted of only 
350 men, no artillery, and no cavalry.62 The Boers, upon learning that the 
summit was so lightly defended, immediately called for volunteers to storm the 
position. Around 180 marksmen, climbed up the slope while the rest of the Boer 
troops provided covering fire. The covering fire was so intense and the cover at 
the top of Majuba so sparse that the British troops holding the summit were 
62 Brian, Bond Victorian Military Campaigns p 225 
50 
forced to keep their heads down while the Boer storming party came within of few 
yards of the summit. 
The sudden appearance of Boers on the summit took the British by 
surprise, and with no defenses prepared inside the rim, the British were lost. 
Colley, who had personally led the troops, was killed along with ninety-two 
others. 63 This defeat convinced the British government to teach the Boers a 
lesson, and it sent vast reinforcements to Transvaal. Before these forces could 
arrive, however, an armistice was signed and the war ended. 
The Boers had defeated the most powerful military in the world, and they 
had done so on their terms. The British had failed to adjust their tactics to the 
Boers' way of war, which was to attack British supply and communication lines 
with hit and run tactics while maintaining a large defensively deployed body of 
troops between the British supply bases and the besieged outposts. Such tactics 
went completely against how the British were trained to fight, and these tactics 
would give the British problems again in 1899 when they fought the Boers for a 
second time. The next time British troops would fight and die in Africa, it would 
be in Egypt and not South Africa. 
The Egyptian campaign of 1882 
The war with Egypt in 1882 came about because of the threat that the 
British Empire would lose control of the Suez Canal. General Sir Garnet 
Wolesely was placed in command of an expedition of 16,416 men to put down a 
63 Brian Bond Victorian Military Campaigns p 229 
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nationalist movement that threatened the security of the Suez Canal. Wolesely 
had complete autonomy to plan the military campaign. 
The British troops were still armed with the Martini-Henry rifle. The army 
also carried Gatling guns and breech-loading artillery. The only major battle was 
fought at Tel-el-Kebir, where the Egyptians were making a stand. The Egyptian 
forces numbered around 25,000 troops, and they had seventy artillery pieces 
including breech-loading Krupp guns.64 Wolseley made a careful 
reconnaissance of the fortifications and discovered that at the fortifications were 
not defended during the night. Wolseley decided that a night march was in order 
so that the army could attack in the early morning before the Egyptians could 
prepare for the attack. 
Wolseley deployed his troops with his British infantry in front of the 
defenses, the cavalry on the right flank and the Indian troops on the left flank.65 
By dawn on September 13, 1882, the Highland Brigade had marched within a 
few hundred yards of the fortifications before Egyptian sentries spotted them and 
fired a few warning shots. The Highlanders charged the defenses, encountering 
the best Egyptian troops, and a fierce melee began. The Highlanders were at 
first unsupported as they had advanced faster than the rest of the troops, and 
they were thrown back for a time. The second line was brought forward though 
and the Highlanders, now supported by artillery fire, broke through the Egyptian 
64 Byron, Farwell Queen Victoria's Little Wars p 266 
65 The Indian troops still carried the Snider-Enfield rifle. This was a repercussion of the Sepoy Mutiny in 
the 1850s, the British government had decided that never again would the Sepoys have the technological 
equivalent of the British regulars. 
defenses.66 The British cavalry by this time, had worked their way around the 
city, and when the Egyptian army attempted to escape, the cavalry either 
captured them or ran them down. 
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The entire campaign took about two months to accomplish, and now the 
British Empire controlled Egypt. Wolesely did not use any new tactics when he 
launched his assault at Tel-el-Kebir. However, he did march his troops into battle 
at night so that he could launch a dawn assault. This was due to the fact that 
Wolesely believed that launching a frontal assault during the day would be very 
costly. This night march was not a new idea, but the British military 
establishment did not often use such actions. 
War in the Sudan: 
When Great Britain finally dispatched troops to deal with Mohammed 
Ahmad ibn al-Sayyid Abdullah, who called himself the Mahdi or proclaimed one, 
many Sudanese tribes had revolted against the Egyptians. The British army had 
changed very little from either the Zulu War or the conflict in Egypt. The infantry 
was still armed with the Martini-Henry rifle though the faults of the rifle had been 
noted during the Zulu War. This new war caused the British Army to start looking 
for a new rifle. 
The artillery that the army used was by now outdated when compared to 
Britain's European rivals who had switched to breech-loaders long ago. Britain 
now decided that rifled muzzle loading artillery was no longer useful and a search 
66 Byron, Farwell Queen Victoria's Little Wars p 267 
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for rifled breech loading artillery was started. By 1885, the Royal Artillery and the 
Royal Horse Artillery had been issued new 12 pound breech-loaders that were 
able to hit targets 5,000 yards away.67 British tactics for this conflict were also 
changed from the norm. The British fought this war in squares and not in the 
famous 'thin red line'. 
The squares offered a variety of advantages over line formation against 
the vast numbers that the Mahdi could muster. A major advantage of the square 
was that it has no flanks that can be turned, so the British soldiers did not have to 
worry about being attacked from behind. Another advantage of the square was 
that it allowed the infantry to better protect any Gatling guns that were attached 
to the unit. Since Gatling guns had the tendency to jam and the chances of 
these weapons jamming increased due to the sand and heat of the Sudan, the 
square allowed the infantry soldiers to fight off any natives while the Gatling 
crews cleared the weapon. The practice worked as long as the troops held fast 
and did not allow any gaps to be created. The British government placed 
Wolesely in command of the expedition. 
Wolesely's command was to relieve Charles 'Chinese' Gordon at 
Khartoum in August, 1884.68 Wolesely recieved ample troops to accomplish the 
task, and he proceeded up the Nile River with his entire force in October 1884. It 
had taken a month to assemble the troops, supplies, and transports. The 
67 Ian, Knight Go to Your God Like a Soldier p 165 
68 Charles Gordon had been sent to the city of Khartoum as a special representative of the British 
Parliament. Gordon refused to abandon Khartoum to the Mahdi. The British public demanded that 
Gordon be saved and this lead to the use of British troops even though the Parliament did not wish to send 
and troops. 
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progress towards Khartoum was very slow, and by January 1885, the British 
were still two hundred miles from Khartoum.69 Wolesely decided to dispatch 
1800 men under the command Brigadier-General Donald Stewart in an effort to 
reach Khartoum before the Madhi's forces overwhelmed the defenders. On 
January 17, 1885, Stewart's force was nearing the well at Abu Klea when 
Mahdist forces attacked. The British force had been marching in two large 
square formations, and when the Mahdist forces attacked, both forces opened 
fire with their rifles and Gatling guns. The day's march had disrupted the first 
square and the rear of the square had lagged behind. The Mahdist veered 
towards the left rear of that square and overwhelmed the Gatiling gun crew and 
fought their way inside. The baggage animals stopped the Mahdist troops long 
enough to give the front face of the square the time to have the second line about 
face and fire into the Mahdists, soon driving them off. 
Disaster was barely avoided, and the column continued on the next day. 
From then on, the column suffered from continued sniping by the enemy and 
Stewart was mortally wounded by such an occurrence. Command of the column 
passed to Sir Charles Wilson who continued to Metemmeh where the Mahdist 
forces were gathering.70 On January 19, 1885, Wilson fought a battle at Abu Kru, 
marching out in square, and supported by troops left in a protected zareba, his 
69 Ian Knight Go to Your God Like a Soldier p 105 
70 Metemmeh is located close to the Nile River and is on the way to Khartoum. 
column met a force of Mahdist troops. The Mahdists charged the square on 
three sides but were not able to close within fifty yards of the square.71 
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The battle won, Wilson marched to the Nile where four armored steamers 
were waiting to transport his force the rest of the way to Khartoum. 72 Wilson 
rested his force for one day and then proceeded up the Nile. The journey took 
three days, but by the time the British, arrived Khartoum had already been 
overrun by the Mahdi two days before, Gordon had been killed, and the relief 
expedition was a complete failure. The British government decided to withdraw, 
even though the British public demanded that Gordon's death be avenged. 
The British did not get involved with the Sudan again until 1896, when the 
Egyptian Army was ordered to occupy a northern Sudanese province. Under the 
command of General Sir Herbert Kitchener, the Egyptian troops did just that, but 
it was decided that Kitchener would need British regulars to confront the Khalifa 
in 1897.73 The British Army had some new weapons at its disposal for this 
conflict. The most revolutionary of these weapons, the Maxim machine gun, was 
invented in 1891 by Hiram Maxim. This machine gun had only one barrel and 
was water-cooled, belt fed ammunition, and fired by depressing the trigger. The 
recoil of the Maxim ejected spent casings and loaded a new bullet into the 
breech. The Maxim could fire at a rate of 600 rounds a minute out to 2,000 
yards.74 
71 The square maintained cohesion during the entire engagement and with well directed rifle fire and 
shellfire from the troops in the zareba the Madists were thrown back. 
72 Ian, Knight Go to Your God Like a Soldier p 106 
73 The Khalifa was the successor of the Mahdi and had set up an Islamic state in the Sudan. 
74 Ian, Knight Go to Your God Like a Soldier p 171 
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The British Army had by now also abandoned the Martini-Henry Rifle and 
gone through several magazine feed rifles. The current rifle the British used was 
the Lee-Enfield rifle. The .303 caliber Lee-Enfield had a ten shot capacity, a bolt 
action, and its cartridges were smokeless. Since the Lee-Enfield used 
smokeless cartridges the British soldiers could fire at the enemy without leaving a 
visible sign of their locations. 
These new weapons would prove to be a tremendous advantage during 
the conquest of the Sudan. Kitchener built up supplies and then advanced on 
the Atbara River, with a powerful force consisting of 14,000 men, twelve machine 
guns, and twenty-four cannons.75 The Khalifa had sent a force of 12,000 
Mahdists under the command of Mahmud wad Ahmad. Ahmad had entrenched 
his force on the Atbara River. On April 8, 1898, Kitchener attacked the 
entrenched Mahdists, starting with an artillery barrage. The artillery shelled the 
Mahdists for several hours after which Kitchener sent in the infantry in line. The 
Mahdist troops fought fiercely, but they were forced to retreat leaving 3,000 dead 
troops behind them.76 Kitchener did not continue his advance until August, 
marching for the Omdurman and reaching the city in about a month. 
The Khalifa let Kitchener advance unmolested as he gathered his army of 
40,000 men at Omdurman. British gunboats had sailed up the Nile and reached 
the city of Omdurman just before Kitchener's army did and the gunboats 
protected the British army's rear. Kitchener formed his troops into a large half 
75 Knight, Ian Go to Your God Like a Soldier p 109 
76 Knight Ian, Go to Your God Like a Soldier p 109 
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circle around Omdurman and then waited for the Khalifa to attack him. The 
Dervish army launched their attack by day instead of at night when they would 
have had an advantage. The Dervishes made their main assault out in the open 
straight at the British lines. Machine gun, rifle, and artillery fire annihilated an 
estimated 10,000 Dervishes, and none of them closed to a range greater than 
500 yards.77 The Dervish cavalry, which was opposite the British right flank, was 
led away by the British cavalry, until it was right under the guns of the steamers 
posted on the river. Once the Dervish infantry had been slaughtered in the initial 
attack Kitchener ordered the advance on Omdurman. By doing so, the British 
army marched along the front of the main Dervish army, which had not attacked. 
Kitchener had exposed the army's entire flank to the enemy. Colonel Hector 
Macdonald saved the day when his brigade consisting of Egyptian and Sudanese 
troops, turned to face the 20,000 Dervishes charging him led by the Khalifa's 
brother. 
Colonel Macdonald's brigade bravely faced the horde of Dervishes that 
attacked them and held them off till Kitchener could form the army back into 
fighting formations to support Macdonald.78 The Khalifa was defeated and the 
war ended. Gordon had been avenged, and Egypt was safe. No lessons were 
learned though. The firepower of the Maxim machine gun had killed thousands of 
Dervishes as they attacked across open ground. The idea that European infantry 
would succeed in such an attack because they had better discipline and morale 
77 Farwell Byron Queen Victoria's Little Wars p 336 
78 At the end of the day, Macdonald's brigade had about two rounds of ammunition per man. 
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was a major belief held by the British high command.79 This belief still held true 
when the British Army fought the Boers in the 1899-1902 Boer War. 
The Boer War 1899-1902: 
The Boer War was different from all the other wars that Britain had fought 
during Queen Victoria's reign for several reasons. First, it lasted longer than any 
of the previous conflicts of Victoria's reign. Second, it involved large armies 
including many volunteers who were ill trained. Britain was ill prepared for the 
conflict with only 14,750 regulars were stationed in South Africa when the war 
started on October 11, 1899.80 An army of 47,000 men under the command of 
General Sir Redvers Buller, VC, was on the way but those troops would not 
arrive until after the conflict started.81 
The Boers were a well-equipped fighting force though there was no 
regular army. The primary weapon of the Boers was the 1896 pattern Mauser 
rifle. They also had modern Krupp artillery pieces and Maxim machine guns. 
Combining these weapons with knowledge of the terrain and an unconventional 
style of warfare meant that the Boers would have a major advantage in fighting 
the British. 
The British, on the other hand, had the Lee-Enfield Mark I rifle which 
Kitchener's army had just used in the Sudan. Even though the artillery had 
modern breech loading guns, a major flaw was that the Royal Artillery still fought 
79 Racism was also a major factor in this idea. The British officer corps believing that whites just made 
better soldiers can also be factored into the equation. WWI would show that charging straight at 
entrenched machine gun nests it did not matter which ethnic background troops came from, no army could 
charge machine guns in such a manner without suffering massive casualties. 
80Byron Farwell Queen Victoria's Little Wars p 340 
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as it had during the Napoleonic wars. This meant that it used direct fire the 
majority of the time. There was no reliable way of firing artillery indirectly which 
was not a problem when fighting opponents primarily armed with spears, but 
against the Boers who had modern rifles, the artillerists were exposed to 
accurate rifle fire. The British also suffered from a lack of mobility. Since early in 
the war, the Boers shelled the railroads, the infantry was forced to march on foot. 
Although cavalry and mounted infantry were present, they were not used 
effectively until after several military disasters had occurred. 
The Boers began the war by invading Natal, and the first battle was joined 
on October 20, 1899, at the town of Dundee by Talana Hill. The British had 
camped in the valley and had left Talana Hill and nearby Mount lmpati 
unoccupied. The British troops consisted of 4,000 British regulars including 
eighteen cannons and were commanded by Major General Sir William Penn 
Symons, awoke on October 20 to discover Boers on Talan Hill with three field 
guns.82 The Boers opened fire at 5:40 a.m., and the British artillery responded 
quickly with all three batteries firing by 6:30 a.m., and by 6:40 had silenced the 
Boer guns.83 Symons decided to attack the entrenched Boers on Talana Hill 
with his artillery, infantry and cavalry.84 He ordered the infantry to make a frontal 
assault, which succeeded with heavy casualties. The rapid fire of the Boers 
Mausers combined with the fact that most of the Boers were marksmen had 
81 Byron Farwell Queen Victoria's Little Wars p 340 
82 Thomas Pakenham, The Boer War pp 127-128 
83 Thomas Pakenham, The Boer Warp 128-130 
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caused 254 casualties among the British infantry including Symons. Casualties 
rise to over 500 with the British cavalry added in, while the entire Boer force 
escaped.85 Also the British infantry had hesitated during the assault. They had 
not wanted to leave cover due to the accurate Mauser fire. 
The Boers then began to bottle up British forces at the towns of 
Ladysmith, Kimberly, and Mafeking. The British towns were not in any real 
danger of falling since they were not totally cut off which siege warfare requires.86 
Politics required that the British invasion force under General Buller's command 
relieve the cities. The city of Kimberly was politically the most important due to 
the presence of Cecil Rhodes.87 Some 8,000 men under the command of Lt. 
General Lord Methuen, a staff officer who was commanding troops for the first 
time, were dispatched to relieve Kimberly. The force met the Boers for the first 
time on November 23, 1899, at Belmont Hill. The Boers were fortified on 
Belmont Hill, and Methuen decided on a frontal assault led by the Brigade of the 
Guards.88 When the Guards charged the Boer positions, the Boers calmly shot 
84 This tactic was the same all regular European armies were trained to do. First an artillery bombardment, 
then the infantry would make an all out attack, and the cavalry would cut off the enemy retreat. 
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86 To effectively besiege a city the attacking force must completely surround the city. If this cannot be 
accomplished the defenders will be able to be re-supplied with greater ease, and the defenders could escape 
from the city. Nor were the Boers to keen on launching assaults against the fortified British regulars. 
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the Guards as they advanced, then mounted their horses and rode away. The 
British suffered 297 casualties, while the Boers suffered fewer than 150.89 
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Methuen did not learn from his mistake, and when he met the Boers again 
he repeated it. On November 25, 1899, Methuen began the Battle of Graspaan, 
with a frontal assault led by the Naval Brigade. The Naval Brigade suffered fifty 
percent causalities while the Boer losses were light, and still General Methuen 
did not learn that frontal attacks against entrenched enemies were fool hardy.90 
Methuen marched to the Madder River next where 3,000 Boers were entrenched 
and waiting for him.91 
The Boers at Madder River were entrenched in natural earthworks and 
had barbed wire strung in front of their position. They had six or seven Krupp 
field guns, and three or four Maxim one pounder cannons supporting them. 
General Koos De la Rey and General Piet Cronje led the Boers. Rey placed his 
men not on the tops of the hills but in trenches on the banks of the Madder River, 
limiting effectiveness of the fire. This way British field guns would not be as 
effective. 
On November 28, 1899, the attack on Madder River began. It was a hot 
day, and the though they had orders to hold their fire as long as possible, the 
Boers under Cronje's command opened fire at a distance of about 1,000 yards.92 
Methuen proceeded to launch a frontal assault even though the Boers flanks 
were not protected. The assault force was soon pinned down and Methuen led 
89 Thomas Pakenham, The Boer War p 194 
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some Highlanders in a charge towards the river. This achieved nothing. The 
British were pinned down in the midday sun with the temperature reaching 
between 90-11 O degrees Fahrenheit, and they soon began to get thirsty, as one 
would expect. The British soldiers could do little, but the artillery soon began to 
engage the Boers. The 24 British guns were out in the open while the Boer guns 
fired from concealed emplacements. The two sides engaged in an artillery duel, 
with the British failing to take out a single Boer cannon. The British were unable 
to force their way across the river though several attempts were made. The 
Boers withdrew under the cover of darkness after causing 460 casualties.93 
The British were technically the victors since the Boers retreated, and 
there was still one more battle to be fought by Methuen. The Battle of 
Magerfontein was a disaster for Methuen's command and particularly the 
Highland Brigade. On December 10, 1899, the Highland Brigade advanced 
toward Magerfontein Hill. At four hundred yards, the Boers in their trenches at 
the foot of the hill opened fire. The Highland Brigade became pinned down just 
as the Guards Brigade had been at Modder River. The Highlanders held for nine 
hours, under constant fire with only the Royal Artillery able to support them. 
Finally the Highland Brigade, who had nearly broken thorough once during the 
day, could stand no more and ran. The British suffered 902 casualties, including 
Major-General Andrew Wauchope the commander of the Highland Brigade, 
compared to the Boers 236.94 The Boers did not retreat during the night as they 
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had at Madder River, instead dawn found them still in their trenches ready to 
repel another attack. On December 11, 1899, General Methuen began to retreat 
to the Madder River. Elsewhere the British Army was suffering similar defeats to 
the Boers. General William Forbes Gatacre lost at Stormberg, and Buller lost at 
Conseno. Each of these defeats occurred within the same week, and the news 
of which was not received well at home. 
Field Marshal Lord Roberts whose son had been killed at Conseno 
replaced Buller. Roberts arrived in Cape Town on January 10, 1900, and he 
began the British offensive one month later. Roberts immediately set about 
creating mobile columns of mounted infantry which ended the Boers advantage 
of greater mobility. Roberts joined Methuen's force on the Madder River intent 
on relieving Kimberly, while Buller, now Roberts subordinate, still trying to relieve 
Ladysmith. Roberts had an entire Army Corps at his command, forty thousand 
men organized in five divisions. This number included 100 guns and a division of 
cavalry.95 The cavalry division, under Lieutenant General John French's 
command, was given the task of out flanking the Boers and relieving Kimberly. 
The cavalry's march did not go smoothly because they ran into supply 
problems from the outset. This slowed the cavalry's march several hours each 
day as they waited for the supply trains to catch up. On February 15, 1900, the 
cavalry was able to move freely and speed toward Kimberly. 96 Although 
95Thomas Pakenham, The Boer Warp 326 
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Kimberly was relieved, the move effectively destroyed the cavalry division, 
because of many of the horses being ridden to death. 
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With the relief of Kimberly, Roberts began to bring Conje and his 4,000 
men to bay. Conje had taken up new positions at Paardeberg River. The British 
encircled General Conje with some 15,000 men under the command of 
Lieutenant General Thomas Kelly-Kenny.97 Kelly-Kenny was in command for 
only a short while because Field Marshall Roberts ordered him to take 
commands from Kitchener. Kelly-Kenny had a sound plan started. Simply put, 
he was going to surround Conje with his infantry and then use his artillery to 
pound the Boer laager to dust. This was a sound plan since Conje had 
entrenched himself in trenches and rifle pits. The ground was unsuitable to any 
infantry assault, but Kitchener disagreed. He ordered all the infantry to assault 
the Boer position immediately so an attack was launched on February18, 1900. 
Kelly-Kenny's Sixth Division was delegated to launch a frontal assault; the Ninth 
Division attacked from the south bank, the right hook, and the north bank, which 
was the left hook. 
The frontal attack occurred just like the Battle of Modder River. The 
British advanced, and became pinned down from relentless rifle fire. The 
Highland Brigade, which had been delegated to make the 'right hook' attack, 
made a frontal attack with the Sixth Division. The Boers pinned down the 
Highlanders as they had pinned the Sixth Division. Kitchener ordered a final 
97 Thomas Pakenham, The Boer Warp 349 
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effort by the mounted infantry. They were to charge the laager while the rest of 
Kitchener's force renewed attacks. 98 
This renewed attack failed as well, and at the end of the day, the British 
had accomplished nothing except to allow a Boer guerrilla force to capture a key 
hill that became known as Kitcheners Kopje. Roberts arrived to take charge of 
the situation on February 19. Roberts did not renew the attack, as Kitchener 
wanted; he really did not do anything. Instead, Cronje surrendered on February 
27, 1900, after the guerrilla force abandoned Kitchener's Kopje and all hope of 
escape was lost. More good news followed. On February 28, Buller relieved 
Ladysmith. Then on May 17, Mafeking was relieved, and on June 5, 1900, 
British forces took Pretoria, the capital of Transvaal. Normally this would have 
ended a conflict.99 However, the Boers refused to give up, instead they turned to 
guerrilla warfare. 
The British forces, now under the command of Kitchener, since Roberts 
had gone home a hero of the British Empire, were forced to change tactics to 
deal with the new Boer tactic. By forming his mobile columns, Roberts had 
accomplished part of adapting to the guerrilla warfare the Boers were carrying 
out. The second task was learning how to deal with farmers turned soldiers, who 
could fade into the background again as a farmer anytime they wished and who 
could gain food at any number of native farms. The British found a way to deny 
the Boers of their supplies. They burned the farms and fields and slaughtered 
98 Thomas Pakenham, The Boer Warp 354-355 
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the stock, effectively destroying the Boers' ability to stay in the field as a fighting 
force.100 That is what Kitchener hoped at least, but plan failed. The Boers were 
able to conduct military operations living off captured British supplies and what 
civilians gave them. So Kitchener decided the civilians had to be prevented from 
helping the guerrillas. To accomplish this, he ordered them placed into camps. 101 
Many women and children died in the camps due to inadequate supplies, poor 
sanitation, and lack of medical care. Without the civilians help or the ability to 
live off the land, the Boers were slowly defeated. The war did not end until May 
31, 1902, when Boer peace delegates signed a treaty with the British. By this 
time Queen Victoria was dead, and Britain would know relative peace until 1914. 
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The British Army fought numerous wars from 1775 to 1902. During that 
time, weapons technology improved from muzzle loading weapons to magazine 
fed rifles and breech loading cannons. However British tactics almost never 
changed during this span of one hundred and twenty seven years to adapt to the 
new technology. When tactics changed due to new weapons, it was innovative. 
The most innovative changes occurred during the reign of King George Ill. 
During the American Revolution, the British Army began to experiment with rifles 
to fight American troops, some of whom were already armed with these deadly 
accurate weapons. When the war ended, the British Army did stop 
experimenting with rifles. However, when the Napoleonic wars, began the 
French began using large numbers of skirmishers to soften up their enemies 
before a main attack by the regular infantry was launched. This caused the 
British Army to raise an experimental Rifle Corp. The Rifle Corp, armed with a 
more accurate weapon than the musket and given special training in how to 
combat French skirmishers, was a major leap in combat tactics. This experiment 
was so successful that the French were not able to attack the main British lines 
during the battles in the Peninsula. Those regiments armed with the rifle became 
a permanent force in the British Army after the Napoleonic wars ended. 
Then the Duke of Wellington used a tactic that the British Army had not 
used during previous wars. Wellington deployed his army on the reverse slopes 
of hills. This gave Wellington an advantage, as it protected his small army from 
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French firepower, and the French were never able to ascertain exactly where his 
army was. Wellington's development of the 'reverse slope' allowed the British to 
protect Portugal and eventually drive into southern France, freeing Spain in the 
process. Wellington then faced Napoleon Bonaparte at the Battle of Waterloo. 
Using the same tactics he had mastered fighting in Spain, Wellington was able to 
hold out long enough for the Prussians to arrive to tip the scales in the Allies 
favor. After this victory, the British Army had a period of stagnation when it came 
to new tactics. Part of this was due to Europe being at peace until 1854. The 
other reason was Wellington's legacy among the officer corp. 
Many officers who served Wellington during the Pennisula war and then at 
the Battle of Waterloo would lead the troops in battle during the first two decades 
of Queen Victoria's reign. These officers all seemed to have the belief that 
Wellington's tactics were perfect since he had defeated Napoleon with them. 
Wellington was primarily a defensive general; in the battles where he attacked 
his enemy, he basically went straight at the enemy. He attacked from out in the 
open; the regular line troops were not trained to fight from cover, since this would 
reduce the effectiveness of a musket. 
Many of the generals who came after Wellington adopted this form of 
fighting. For example, General Hugh Gough, during the' Sikh War, launched 
frontal assaults at an entrenched enemy. These attacks caused heavy 
casualties among British soldiers that could have been avoided if Gough had 
simply chosen to outflank his enemy. Why did the tactics work against the 
Sikhs? It all comes down to the British soldier and his Brunswick musket. The 
69 
Brunswick musket used the percussion cap, instead of flint, to detonate the 
powder charge; this reduced the amount of misfires among British weapons. 
Then there is the fact that the British soldier simply refused to acknowledge that 
he was beaten. That is why Gough won his battles. 
During the Crimean War, the British had the problem of not learning from 
conflicts in India and Asia. The weapons the British used were the same as 
those used in the Sikh War, but the enemy was the Russians. The British Army 
scorned the Russian Army; they thought the Russians simply were not as good 
as British troops. In fact, the Russian were a very tough opponent. The 
Russians had plenty of excellent artillery and bigger guns than the British. The 
British had still used cannons that were the same size as those used during the 
Napoleonic Wars. Raglan's infantry was under artillery fire for some time 
therefore, before the Royal Artillery could respond. That fact should have 
prompted Raglan to attack in some way other than by frontal assaults. Instead, 
Raglan, who had never before commanded troops in battle before, attacked in a 
way consistent with what Wellington would have done against the French. The 
only reason Raglan won his battles was because of the French support and a lot 
of luck. 
The Sepoy Mutiny was a period of new weapons and tactics. The British 
Army had finally adopted a rifled musket, the Enfield. The Royal Artillery had 
also begun experimenting with rifled artillery which gave the British some 
advantages. There were two kinds of tactics during the Sepoy Mutiny, the 
defensive tactics used by besieged British garrisons, and the offensive tactics of 
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the relief expeditions. The defensive tactics were nothing new; the only hope for 
besieged troops is to hold out long enough to be relieved. There were new ideas 
to the offensive operations though. General Havelock launched flank attacks to 
conserve his small attack force. While flank attacks were not new in war, it was 
an adaptation to the Sepoy's defensive tactics. Certainly Havelock's tactics were 
more sensible than frontal attacks. Then, during the fighting in cities, the British 
tried some different things. They tried to flow around 'hard points,' sometimes 
leaving a force to tie down the enemy and bypassing it completely. The British 
won the war, of course, and after that there was a period of Wellington's tactics 
seeing reuse. 
The next war that saw new weapons and tactics was the Zulu War. The 
British had issued a new breech-loading rifle, the Westley-Richards rifle, and the 
Gatling gun. The British had not learned anything from the American Civil War 
even though they had sent observers. The major lesson of that war was about 
defensive firepower at the point of attack. Fredericksburg and Gettysburg 
showed that attacking a well-entrenched enemy was very costly in terms of men. 
That lesson seemed to go right out the window. Then the Zulu war occurred. 
The British fought one battle against the Zulus in the open, and the Zulus 
slaughtered the British to a man. That defeat drove home the importance of 
defensive firepower. After that Chelmsford fought either from laagers or very 
large 'square' formations when he encountered the Zulus. These new ideas 
were reused in the Sudan when the British became involved in Egypt. 
Britain became involved in Egypt when an Egyptian national movement 
threatened security of the Suez Canal. The British fought one battle with the 
nationalists and defeated them soundly, but this involved the British when the 
Mahdi came to power in the Sudan. Fighting the Mahdi forces was much like 
fighting the Zulus, so the British used square formations to prevent themselves 
from being flanked. This eliminated the high risk they would have faced in 
fighting in a linear formation. During this conflict in 1885, the British were still 
using Gatling guns and Martini Henry rifles. 
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When the war with Sudan in 1896 came along the British had the new 
magazine fed Enfield rifle and Maxim machine guns. The square formations 
were no longer needed. These weapons had tremendous offensive and 
defensive capabilities, but the Maxim was never used as an offensive weapon. 
That was a missed opportunity by the British. One Maxim was a force that could 
halt attacks before the enemy got close to British lines. Had the British organized 
entire companies of Maxims, their firepower could have stopped the Dervishes 
charges with little effort. The advantage of such an organization went unnoticed 
until after the Boer War of 1899. 
Up to this point, the British had not had a problem defeating their 
opponents in battle. All that would change when they began to fight the Boers. 
The first major British conflict with the Boers was the South Africa War. The war 
in South Africa was very short, however, and the British did not have the 
opportunity to change tactics due to the duration of the war. That factor does not 
account for all that happened during the conflict. The Boers were able to strike at 
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the British, seemingly at will because of their greater mobility. The Boers were 
also very good at fighting defensive battles; they knew that by being entrenched, 
an attacker would have a difficult time defeating them in battle. 
In the two major battles of the war, the British commanding officers made 
terrible mistakes. At Lanig Nek, the British infantry attacked across open ground 
against the dug in Boers. The result of the battle was that the British frontal 
attack was bloodily repulsed, and for the first time, British valor failed to carry the 
day. So during the South African War, the British were not a very mobile force, 
and without a clear technological advantage, the British tactics simply did not 
work. When the British fought the Boers again beginning in 1899, the tactics 
used by the British Army still would not work. 
During the Boer War of 1899, the Boers and British both possessed 
modern weapons. The Boers first attacked the British directly, taking the 
offensive when the British were relatively weak in South Africa. These attacks 
were well within the British ability to handle, albeit badly. The Boers were highly 
mobile, and their attacks usually took the British by surprise. Using the same 
methods they had always used, the British won the majority of the battles that 
they fought, during the Boer offensive. The British simply went up the middle as 
they usually did. The results of these actions were much different from previous 
wars. The Boers inflicted heavy casualties on the British, and even though the 
British managed to reach their defensive positions, the Boers rode away, leaving 
British soldiers powerless to stop them. It was evident that the British had to do 
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something else to stop the Boers. The government replaced General Buller, and 
appointed General Roberts in his stead. 
General Roberts quickly decided that to defeat the Boers his troops 
needed to be as mobile as the Boers. Roberts organized special mounted 
infantry companies, which along with his cavalry division, gave Roberts the 
mobility he needed to relieve several besieged cities. When Roberts 
encountered the entrenched Boers, he simply outflanked them with his cavalry 
and then used his numbers to drive the Boers away. The British then launched 
an offensive and captured the Boer capital cities. At this point most European 
nations would have ended resistance, which is what the British expected. The 
Boers refused to acknowledge that defeat and began to fight as guerrillas 
instead. 
The British did not have great success in fighting the Boers when they 
switched tactics. The Boers simply faded into the general population. After all, 
the Boer soldiers were simply farmers, and the people did what they could to 
protect them. General Kitchener had to decide how to deal with this. His 
solution was to arrest all suspected Boer sympathizers and place them in camps. 
The Boers still fought on, so Kitchener tried to deprive the Boers of supplies. The 
British used a scorched earth policy, which ended the Boer ability to live off the 
land. These two tactics, while somewhat brutal, were accomplishing what a force 
of arms was not. Against the Boers, the British had learned and adapted the 
tactic of total war. 
The British used one other tactic against the Boers, as well. That tactic 
was overwhelming numbers. This allowed the British to hunt the guerrillas 
relentlessly. The Boers could not escape, because the British would not stop 
hunting them. It worked, and the Boers were finally defeated. That being said, 
the British never used their weapons technology very well. 
74 
The knowledge of weapons technology was not used because the majority 
of British officers never had any formal schooling in the art of war. There was no 
required attendance of a military academy for many years in England, save for 
those those members of the Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers. Therefore, 
because officers were not required to learn military tactics from previous wars, 
many did not do so. Many British generals never had experience leading troops 
in battle until they were given armies to command. The most famous example of 
this occurred during the Crimean War, when General Raglan was given 
command of the army because it was his turn. Common sense would dictate 
that military commanders should be chosen because of their abilities, not due to 
political influence or length of service. 
The British government also contributed to the problem by not paying for 
new weapons systems until absolutely necessary. This went against what the 
rest of Europe was doing at the time. France, the United States, and Germany 
were continually experimenting with new weapons and ideas. Since England 
always had the notion that there would be a war with France, this lack of utilizing 
the technology that their enemy was starting to use is peculiar. 
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Except for rare cases, the British government was more than happy to 
wait until other governments had spent the money and effort developing new 
weapons, before they would approve spending the money to upgrade their 
armies' weapons. Certainly there were some advantages to waiting for a new 
weapon to be perfected, for example, when breech-loading artillery was decided 
to be too expensive and untried. Those advantages did not out weigh the costs 
of waiting. It is far better to spend the money to develop new weapons and learn 
what those weapons can do to an enemy rather than learn for ones self on the 
battlefield with heavy casualties. The reluctance to spend the money for new 
weapons had one other effect. The army came to accept the status quo in 
tactics since they worked to defeat native soldiers armed primarily with muskets, 
spears, and shields. 
Another contributing factor to the misuse of weapons technology was the 
failing of the British Army to learn from conflict that did not occur between 
Europeans. Principal among these conflicts was the American Civil War. The 
British Army sent observers to that war to learn about American tactics and 
weapons. Those observers did not see the war for what it was. They saw it as 
unprofessional soldiers fighting unprofessional soldiers, instead of learning that 
attacking an entrenched enemy over open ground was virtual suicide. The 
observers saw these attacks as wonderful gallant charges, which might have 
succeeded had the British been doing it. So bad was the British inability to learn, 
that they did not even learn from their own conflicts. The South African War 
should have given them an idea what fighting the Boers would be like in 1899. In 
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the next war with Europeans, British soldiers would pay the price for the failing of 
their officers to learn how to adapt tactics to the current technology. 
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